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THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
THE FIRM©
BY ROBERT FLANNIGAN*
Considerable effort has been channelled into
theoretical investigations of the structure of the firm
over the past several years. Most of the new work has
been produced by economists. Lawyers have been
content simply to draw upon the economic arguments,
often in an uncritical way. The author examines the
various economic models and identifies their shared
dependence on the significance of an actors' control
over the employment of assets. The control
proposition is then further developed in the course of
the construction of a general model focussing on the
production unit.
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arguments 6conomiques trop critiquement. L'auteur
examine les diffdrents modules 6eonomiques et
identifie, parmi eux, un aspect commun qui met
l'accent sur le contr6le des acteurs quant A rusage des
actifs. Cette proposition de base est d6veloppoe par la
construction d'un module qui se concentre sur i'unit6
de production.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A business organization has both a legal and an economic
structure. The legal structure is comprised of the various rules which
define the rights and responsibilities of the parties in the different types
of business organization. The economic structure is simply the material
relations of the particular economic arrangement. It is easy enough to
identify and describe these cognate structures in a given case. It is a
more difficult task to develop theoretical models to organize the specific
legal or economic characteristics of the individual organization forms.
For many years, few lawyers or economists engaged in this task.
Eventually, however, the attention of economists did turn to the
elaboration of a number of theories purporting to explain the physical
existence and size of firms. Lawyers, during this time, did not produce
their own distinct theories of legal structure. Rather, they invoked those
new economic models that served their particular theoretical purposes.
These efforts to enlist the support of economics, however, were often
rudimentary or largely rhetorical. Consequently, the actual application
of economic theories in the legal analysis of the firm has been limited.
Part of the difficulty is that economists themselves admit no consensus
on the specific elements and mechanisms of firm structure. It may be,
however, that there is order underlying the surface disparity of the
various economic theories. If that could be established, it would imply,
or lay the foundation for, a coincident theoretical model of legal
structure.
The primary object of the discussion that follows is to construct a
model of the economic structure of the firm. This is an economic
analysis of the physical arrangement. It is not an economic analysis of
the legal structure (i.e., the legal rules) although, once constructed, the
model is intended to inform that analysis. The primary object is pursued
initially through a critical review of the various theories economists have
offered to explain the structure of the firm. The analysis reveals a
common (either overt or derivative) appeal to control as the explanation
for firm structure. Generally speaking, the structure exists for, and is
limited by, the projection of risk (control). Specifically, the significant
benefits and major limitations of the firm are shown to be located in the
actor's control over the employment of human and physical capital.
Control (fiat), accordingly, is the essential defining attribute of the firm.
This fundamental proposition, widely accepted but poorly understood, is
then developed in a model in which the production unit, rather than the
transaction, is made the focus of analysis. This departure from
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transaction cost economics (where the transaction is the focus of
analysis) allows for a theory of structure that more easily accommodates
or explains the variation in the material relations of the firm
arrangement.
As will soon appear, the discussion is exclusively economic in
nature and parts of the material deal with what, for some lawyers, are
novel concepts. With this in mind, an effort has been made to make the
discussion accessible to a general legal audience with at least an interest
in economic analysis. Still, in certain instances where clarification or
elaboration is required, the reader may find it worthwhile to make
reference to the commentary in the multiple sources provided, chosen in
part for their own relative accessibility.
II. FIRMS AND MARKETS
Firms are distinguished from markets by their production
function. Markets involve only exchanges. A market does not produce
goods. Without prior production, or the promise of production, there is
nothing to exchange. Markets therefore presume the existence of
production units. These production units are generally labelled "firms."
The nature of this "firm" or production unit may be investigated initially
by analyzing the production of a particular good.
A simple example illustrates the choice an actor will make
between exchange (the market) and production (the firm) in order to
obtain a particular good. Consider the production of good Y, a process
involving two stages. In the first stage, good X is produced. In the
second stage, good X is consumed in the production of good Y. The two
stages utilize separable serial technologies. The issue for an actor
intending to produce good Y is how to obtain good X. The actor can
choose to enter the market for good X and simply purchase the required
amount. Alternatively, the actor can enter the factor market for good X
and purchase the means to produce it internally. Recourse to the
market for good X leaves production in the hands of another. Recourse
to the factor market brings production within the control of the actor.
This indicates that the nature of the firm can be understood in terms of
the position of the actor subsequent to the use of the market. At that
time, if the actor purchased good X, there is no process remaining to
occur in its production. The actor's firm is limited to the production of
good Y. The firm of some other actor produces good X. Purchasing the
means to produce good X, on the other hand, contemplates action.
Further effort on the part of the actor is necessary in order to convert
1995]
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the factors into product. Specifically, the actor will be required to make
a series of choices concerning how the various factors will be
coordinated so as to eventually produce good X. The actor, in other
words, will control the employment of assets. On this view, where firms
are associated with production, the nature of the firm is found in the
applied control of the actor. Firms, then, are arrangements for the
exercise of control over the employment of assets.
The firm is both a structure and a process. The structure is
created by the collection of contracts the actor negotiates to acquire the
productive factors. The exchange aspect of these contracts, once they
are executed, is exhausted. It is their content that now becomes
significant. That content, in the case of each particular contract, is the
acquired right to control the associated physical or human capital.
Usually, in the case of physical capital, this right is obtained by
contracting for ownership. More limited rights to control may instead be
purchased through a loan, lease, license, or other contractual form. For
human capital, the right to control is acquired through the negotiation of
contracts of service. The combination of these rights creates a
framework or structure for the realization of the actor's choices.
The firm is a process in both a structural and a production sense.
Initially, the actor must exercise control (the process) over existing assets
(often borrowed cash) to allocate them in such a way as to acquire the
optimal collection of pre-production control rights. That is, the actor
must make choices as to the nature of the structure to be created.
Thereafter, in the production stage, the actor must again make choices
(the process) in the manipulation of the acquired control rights. These
structural and productive processes interact with and influence one
another. Thus, the actor's acquisition of control rights will be affected
by the kind of production contemplated. Similarly, the exercise of
control over one factor may be circumscribed by the degree of control
exercisable over another factor. These processes, and the structure they
create, define the essential character of the firm. Fundamentally, the
firm is a control structure-an arrangement for the idiosyncratic taking
of risks.
Firms and markets are associated with different processes.
Markets involve exchanges, firms involve production. This is not to say,
however, that firms and markets are unconnected. Firms acquire
intermediate goods in markets and supply intermediate and final goods
to other markets. Markets also regulate firms. Product, factor
(managers, capital), and control markets discipline firms and determine
their viability. Further, in one respect, a firm can replace a market.
When a producer of good Y integrates the production of good X into
[VOL 33 NO. I
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what is now a firm of two combined but separable technologies, the
former exchange to obtain good X is replaced by its internal production.
The movement of good X into the good Y production stage becomes
exclusively a matter of production (a directed transfer), rather than an
initial exchange followed by a transfer. This does not mean, however,
that firms can do what markets do. It only means that the market is
utilized at a different point in time. The acquisition of good X was
achieved when the actor acquired the means to produce good X.
Firms and markets are necessarily connected in one other
important general sense. The production boundary of a firm occurs at
the interface where the control of one actor is met by the control of
another actor. The inability of actors to control beyond their distinct
collection of control rights necessarily requires an exchange if there is to
be a connection between their production units. The absence of control,
in this respect, requires the presence of exchange. The fact of exchange
marks or identifies the pre-exchange control boundaries of the
interacting actors (firms).
The observation that the scope of a firm corresponds to the
ambit of the actor's control applies both to the reach of the productive
process (the extent of control) and to the composition of the actor (the
source of control). For production, the boundary is found at the point
where no further control rights are available to be exercised. Exchanges
to acquire additional control rights are required in order to extend
internal production and thereby extend the scope of the firm. The
boundary of the firm, in terms of the composition of the actor, is
similarly premised on control. Normally, for example, the board of
directors, executive officers, or a single major shareholder will be the
actor in a corporation. However, if the corporation becomes the
subsidiary of a controlling parent, the real actor becomes that parent
corporation. In such a case, the boundary of the firm moves upstream to
reflect the new source of control. From the perspective of the parent, its
own boundary moves downstream in the course of what is simply a case
of vertical integration. The firm is now the combination of the
subsidiary and its parent. The connecting factor is the singular control
of the parent corporation over both production units.
The foregoing analysis pictures the firm as a control structure
(production unit) bounded at either end by markets and subjected to
their continuing regulation. This is a sufficiently detailed description
with which to begin an analysis of the historical treatment of the nature
of the firm in economic theory.
1995]
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III. ECONOMIC THEORY
Neoclassical economic theory treated the firm as a production
function, or "black box," operating in an environment of markets and
state regulation.1 The internal workings of the firm went unexplored
The firm was simply a contained set of feasible production plans, the
object of which was to maximize the welfare of the firm's owners. The
theory did not attempt to explain how production within the firm was
organized or what determined firm size. At the micro level, it was
incomplete.
Although there were a number of earlier important efforts to
describe the internal structure and processes of the firm,3 much of the
work (at least in terms of quantity) has been done in the last thirty years.
Those efforts are reviewed and assessed here.4 Specifically, those
arguments that have attracted the most attention, or which are relatively
new, are examined. They will be discussed in the order of their
appearance, more or less, in the literature.
Before proceeding to this task, a number of observations are in
order. The first has to do with the fact that a good portion of the
literature explores the nature of the firm by examining the reasons for
vertical (backward and forward), horizontal, and conglomerate
integration. Such an approach is appropriate in this context because the
integration or disintegration of separable production technologies
determines the size of the firm. Integration occurs, presumably, because
of some advantageous quality of the firm. Accordingly, analyzing the
reasons for integration can suggest what is important about the firm.
Integration, however, cannot be the exclusive analytical subject matter.
Since many firms exploit only one technology or never integrate beyond
their initial technology, the character of firms must be independent of
integration per se.
A second and related observation is that much recent work tends
to focus on transaction (exchange) cost explanations for the
1 See the brief summary of neoclassical theory by L. De Alessi, "Property Rights, Transaction
Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory" (1983) 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 64 at 64-65.
2 See the critique by H. Demsetz, "The Theory of the Firm Revisited" (1988) 4 J.L. Econ. &
Organ. 141 at 142-44. P.J. McNulty, in "On the Nature and Theory of Economic Organization: The
Role of the Firm Reconsidered" (1984) 16 Hist. Pol. Econ. 233, describes the gradual de-emphasis
of the role of the firm in economic theory.
3 Adam Smith, Frank Knight, and Ronald Coase were early contributors. Coase assesses his
original argument in "The Nature of the Firm: Meaning" (1988) 31 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 19.
4 See the review of developments by De Alessi, supra note 1 at 65-66.
110 [VOL- 33 NO. I
The Economic Structure of the Firm
phenomenon of integration. This has the effect of discounting other
possible economic determinants of integration. Market power
(monopoly and monopsony) considerations, for example, have been
implicated in decisions to integrate.5 While the matter is disputed,
recent commentary has suggested that anti-competitive motives can be
important. 6  More significantly, there may be production or
technological reasons for integration. Thus, integration or disintegration
may occur in order to ensure the supply of inputs, exploit comparative
advantages, or exploit economies of scale and scope.7 The reasons
commentators offer for giving production motives only perfunctory
treatment are diverse. Some writers suspect the independent
significance of production determinants in comparison with the
transaction cost approach.8 Other writers accept the importance of
production motives,9 but, for example, claim to have no comparative
advantage in their study10 or assume their inclusion prior to their own
analysis.11 If, however, production-based reasons are important, as they
appear to be, and if integration tells us something about the nature of
the firm, any general theory of the firm must accommodate them in an
explicit way.
The final preliminary observation is to note the importance of
opportunism in economic theorizing about the nature of the firm. The
literature analyzes the operation of opportunism at two points. The first
may be called "exchange" opportunism because it occurs at the time of
the exchange event. For example, when considering whether to use the
market, an actor will consider the possibility that the other party will
5 The monopoly analysis is part of the neoclassical approach. See O.E. Williamson,
"Assessing Contract" (1985) 1 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 177 at 188-90.
6 See M.K Perry, "Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects" in R. Schmalensee & R.D.
Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989) 183;
R.D. Blair & D.L Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control (New York:
Academic Press, 1983).
7 See F.M. Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3d ed.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990) c. 4; and R.D. Buzzell, "Is Vertical Integration Profitable?"
(1983) 61 Harv. Bus. Rev. 92.
8 O.E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational
Contracting (New York: Free Press, 1985) at 86-87; and B.R. Holmstr6m & J. Tirole, "The Theory
of the Firm" in Schmalensee & Willig, supra note 6, 61 at 66.
9 M.H. Riordan & O.E. Williamson, "Asset Specificity and Economic Organization" (1985) 3
Int'l. J. Indus. Organ. 365 at 369.
10 S. Davies, "Vertical Integration" in R. Clarke & T. McGuiness, The Economics of the Firm
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) 83 at 86.
11 Perry, supra note 6 at 187.
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hold out for a greater share of the surplus when the time comes to renew
the contract. The second point in time when opportunism might occur is
during the course of production and may be referred to as "production"
opportunism. Workers (or co-venturers) may shirk, appropriate assets,
or otherwise divert value away from their employer. Opportunities to
act in this way arise because of the absence or inadequacy of monitoring
or because of asymmetric information.
The traditional "agency" or "principal/agent" literature
investigates generally the numerous circumstances in which opportunism
(moral hazard) can be a problem.1 2 It involves attempts to develop
economic solutions to the problem, primarily through the design of
contractual incentives that will induce the agent to maximize the welfare
of the principal.13 Other parts of the literature tend to focus more
specifically on the firm as a response to the problem of either exchange
or production opportunism. This work is identified by a number of
redundant or overlapping labels. It includes the so-called property
rights, incomplete contracts, transaction cost, new institutional
economics, and new science of organization literatures.14 It is to this
material we now turn.
12 See, for example, B. Holmstr6m, "Moral Hazard and Observability" (1979) 10 Bell J. Econ.
74, and"Moral Hazard in Teams" (1982) 13 Bell J. Econ. 324. See also K.J. Arrow, "The
Economics of Agency" in J.W. Pratt & RJ. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: The Structure of
Business (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985) 37.
13 See 0. Hart, "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm" (1989) 89 Colum.
LR. 1757 at 1758-60.
14 See the various references to, and descriptions of, these various literatures in E.F. Fama,
"Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" (1980) 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288; J. Tirole, "The
Multicontract Organization" (1988) 21 Can. 3. Econ. 459; P. Milgrom & J. Roberts, "Economic
Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and Future" (1988) 21 Can. J. Econ. 444; R.H. Coase, "The
New Institutional Economics" (1984) 140 J. Inst'l. & Theor. Econ. 229; O.E. Williamson,
"Reflections on the New Institutional Economics" (1985) 141 J. Inst'l. & Theor. Econ. 187; O.E.
Williamson, "Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance" (1991) 7 J.L Econ.
& Organ. (Special Issue) 159; and Hart, ibid.. Oliver E. Williamson describes his view of the ways in
which agency theory and transaction cost economics differ in "Corporate Finance and Corporate
Governance" (1988) 43 J. Fin. 567.
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A. The Transaction Cost Argument (Coase)
Ronald Coase did not explain "the nature of the firm" in his
1937 paper;15 rather, he assumed or asserted it.16 He took as given the
proposition that control is the essential defining characteristic of the
firm1 7 and then examined the circumstances in which such a structure
would arise. Coase argued that "islands of conscious power"18 (firms)
arose in response to the costs of using the price mechanism.1 9 He
identified the price mechanism (the market) and the firm as "alternative
methods of coordinating production."20 After observing that there were
costs associated with the use of each, he concluded that the price
mechanism and the firm would replace each other depending on their
relative cost. This conclusion, it will be appreciated, purports to tell us
when integration will occur, it is an argument concerning what might be
the motive for the use of a control structure.
It is possible to be more precise about the nature of the choice
that is being made when, for whatever motive, "command" (the firm)
replaces "exchange" (the market). Moreover, it is possible to do this
without reliance on an anthropomorphic price mechanism to do the
coordination work. It is obvious that markets do no actual work
themselves. The price mechanism or market terminology is only
shorthand for the process of exchange or negotiation where persons do
the work of buying and selling (the allocation or coordination of
resources). 21 Recall the example of the production of good Y where
good X is an input. The actor who chooses not to produce good X will
arrange an exchange to acquire it. Thereafter, because the simple
acquisition of good X does not determine its subsequent use, the actor
will direct good X into the good Y production process (rather than, for
example, re-sell it). The actor who instead chooses to produce good X
15 R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) 4 Economica 386.
16 Coase describes the origins of the paper in "The Nature of the Firm: Origin" (1988) 4 J.L.
Econ. & Organ. 3.
17 This is quite clear in the paper where, as one example, he asserts that within the firm
"market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production": supra note 15 at
388.
1 8 Coase borrowed this phrase from D.H. Robertson: see ibid.
19 ]bid.
2 0 Ibid.
2 1 Ibid. at 387. See also McNulty, supra note 2.
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will also utilize the price mechanism when negotiating the purchase of
the means to produce good X. Then, once good X is produced, the
actor will similarly direct it into the good Y production process.
Accordingly, in these respects, the price mechanism and the firm operate
together. There is an acquisition followed by a transfer between
productive stages in both cases. It will be observed that the only
difference between the two procedures is in who controls the actual
production of good X.
Whereas Coase saw a choice between command and negotiation,
we see here a choice between internal and external control of
production. The difference is one of perspective. Coase focussed on
what occurs at the interface between the good X and good Y
technologies. From that perspective, he saw either a command or a
negotiation. He did not present those events as merely the respective
manifestations of the choice the actor makes between internal and
external production. If, however, the choice is one of internal versus
external production (e.g., the integration question), the interface focus is
too narrow. The internalization of the exchange by another exchange
(to become a directed transfer) is only an incident of, or the means by
which to implement, the decision to internalize production. Coase's
approach is useful only when the particular motive for integration
operates at the point of his focus, the interface between independent
production technologies.22 Transaction cost motives are of this kind.
However, since there are other motives for integration, it is necessary to
expand the analytical perspective to include the production process.
The foregoing analysis implicates control over production
(including transfers between production stages) as the defining
characteristic of firms. The choice the actor makes determines who
controls production. The actor will choose to produce when it is
advantageous, relative to purchase, to do so. In this respect, the actor
sees control as a solution to some problem associated with external
production or as conferring some advantage over external production. It
is a solution, for example, where a benefit is gained by the mere
replacement of an exchange or because actual production is more
efficiently carried out internally. In either case, it is the actor's control
that defines the firm's utility.
22 Coase might respond that only that focus is relevant because only transaction costs
determine whether firms exist. In fact, he has described his original article in those terms:
"Transaction costs were used [in the article] to show that if they are not included in the analysis, the
firm has no purpose": "The Nature of the Firm: Influence" (1988) 4 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 33 at 34.
[VOL 33 NO. 1
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Coase began his analysis by asking why there were firms at all
given that markets could perform the coordination task. His answer, it
has been noted, was that there were costs involved in the use of the
market. The most "obvious" cost, in his view, was the cost of
"discovering what the relevant prices are."23 It is doubtful, however, that
this is a cost that matters. The reason is that the identical cost exists for
firms. Whether the choice is to purchase or produce, the actor will
necessarily have to ascertain prices. The actor must determine either the
pricing of good X or of the means to produce good X. Moreover, even
the actor who chooses to produce will continue to monitor prices for
good X in the future in order to set intra-firm transfer prices or to
determine whether cost savings can be achieved by replacing internal
with external production.
The costs of "negotiating and concluding a separate contract for
each exchange transaction" was the second cost identified by Coase?
4
Again, however, the significance of this cost is unclear. The argument
seems to be simply a quantitative one. Thus, instead of negotiating
several serial contracts for external production, the actor can negotiate a
single contract whereby the other party agrees to accept directions or
instructions in the future. A saving would be obtained, ostensibly,
because the costs of negotiating only one contract would be incurred.
The reason this argument is suspect is that the costs are probably of the
same order of magnitude whether or not the firm is used. Where the
transactions involved are similar but repeated, the most likely
candidates,2 5 a standard form contract (e.g., a purchase order and
invoice) will be used and there will be no extended negotiations for
contracts subsequent to the first. The costs of using standard forms are
likely to be comparable to the costs of formulating, recording, and
transmitting a command within the firm.
The third cost Coase identified was the cost of writing a long-
term contract where the actor is unsure of what will be required of the
other party in the future.2 6 The problem the actor faces is production
uncertainty. The cost of contracting is high, in such cases, because the
contract would have to address the numerous contingencies that might
arise over the term of its performance. This cost can be avoided,
23 Supra note 15 at 390.
24]bid. at 390-91.
25 Dissimilar transactions imply different goods, and rare or occasional transactions do not
amount to a significant cost.
26 Supra note 15 at 391-92.
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according to Coase, if the contract does not specify the details but simply
gives the actor a general right, within certain limits, to direct the worker.
The uncertainty initially faced by the actor is ameliorated at lower cost,
presumably, than if a fully contingent contract had been negotiated. The
problem with this argument is its identification of high transaction costs
as the motive for integration. In fact, production uncertainty is the
motive.2 7 The actor is not prepared to make abstract decisions in a
contextual vacuum and is therefore not interested in specifying today a
response to every contingency that might arise tomorrow. More
positively, the actor intentionally seeks flexibility precisely in order to
respond to changes at the time they occur. It is a production motive at
work here. The actor acquires control in order to deal with production
uncertainty, not to avoid the unknowable cost of a fully contingent
contract.
After Coase concluded that the introduction of a firm was due to
the costs of using the market,28 he asked why there were market
transactions at all 2 9 If firms had cost advantages, why was all
production not carried on by one very large firm? His answer was the
same as for markets: there were costs associated with the use of firms.
He pointed to the rising costs "of organizing additional transactions
within the firm," the entrepreneur's failure "to make the best use of the
factors of production," and the increase in the price of supplies because
"the 'other advantages' of a small firm were greater than those of a large
firm.o3 0 Unfortunately, there is little elaboration of these costs by
Coase.31 He did indicate, however, that "the first two reasons given most
probably correspond to the economists' phrase of 'diminishing returns to
management.' 3 2 Presumably, with respect to the first two reasons,
Coase had in mind specific problems such as control loss in hierarchies
and physical limitations on the ability of individuals to process
27 The actor experiences a condition of uncertainty and seeks to reduce that uncertainty by
some appropriate measure. One possibility is to write a comprehensive contract; another is to
purchase the right to control. There may be other solutions, each with its own particular costs. The
point is that the motivation is production uncertainty, and comprehensive contracts and firms are
simply alternative possible solutions.
28 Coase also mentions the market costs of differential government regulation, e.g., taxation
and quotas, but dismisses their significance in bringing firms into existence: supra note 15 at 393.
29 ibid. at 394.
30 ibid. at 395.
31 Consider the "individualistic spirit" argument cited with reference to the third cost, ibid. at
395 note 1, and Coase, supra note 3 at 32.
3 2 Supra note 15 at 395.
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information.33 If that is correct, it becomes apparent that the size of the
firm is constrained by the limitations of its defining characteristic. That
is, when control breaks down, the firm becomes costly, in relative terms,
and will have no advantage over the market. This is an expected result if
the firm is regarded as essentially a control structure. If that control fails
because it is not transmitted (either up or down) through more than a
few levels of hierarchy,34 or because the actor is burdened with too little
or too much information,3 5 the potential benefits of exercising control
cannot be realized. Firm size is thereby limited unless structural
changes36 or technological innovations3 7 can partially relieve the control
breakdown in some way.
Coase assumed that the firm is characterized by the control of an
actor. In the course of the above analysis an attempt has been made to
develop this proposition beyond its stark assertion. It has been shown
how the control element generally determines whether the structure can
be advantageous in given circumstances. Thus, acquiring control allows
the actor to deal with production uncertainty in a flexible manner.
Where it was not clearly advantageous, as in the cases of the first two
market costs identified by Coase, there was reason to doubt that control
was a solution or that there was even a solvable problem or reducible
cost. As well, the optimum size of the firm was seen to depend in part
on the failure of control processes. The analysis, in this way, amounts to
a rehabilitation of Coase's view of what motivates the use of the firm, as
well as an elaboration of his control assumption.
33 Coase alludes to this in his reference to increases in costs when the spatial distribution and
heterogeneity of transactions increase: ibid. at 397.
34 See G.A. Calvo & S. Wellisz, "Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the
Firm" (1978) 86 J. Pol. Econ. 943; W.G. Ouchi, "The Transmission of Control Through
Organizational Hierarchy" (1978) 21 Acad. Mgmt. J. 173; and O.E. Williamson, "Hierarchical
Control and Optimum Firm Size" (1967) 75 J. Pol. Econ. 123. Note that Williamson later changes
his views: supra note 8 at 134-35.
35 See the discussion of information considerations by Demsetz, supra note 2.
36 An example would be a change from a unitary to a multidivisional form of oganization. See
O.E. Williamson, "Corporate Governance" (1984) 93 Yale LJ. 1197 at 1222-26 and ifra note 56 at
85.
3 7 Examples of technological innovations in the communications area include the telegraph,
telephone, and computer.
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B. The Monitor Argument
Alchian and Demsetz denied that the firm could properly be
characterized by the power to resolve disputes by fiat 8 They believed
this idea to be a "delusion" in relation to the employment of human
capital.3 9 They argued that an employer has no more control over
employees than over independent contractors. The employer can direct,
but the employees can refuse to accept that direction. The employer
must therefore obtain their agreement to any proposal. The interaction
of the parties is just another contract, like any other market contract (the
"nexus of contracts" idea).4 0 Notionally, the labour of employees is
being purchased, as in the case of independent contractors, in a spot
market. Alchian and Demsetz concluded that employment contracts
(which Coase associated with the firm) were "not the essence of the
organization we call the firm."41
As Alchian and Demsetz saw it, the internal organization of the
firm is a response to the problem of shirking (production opportunism).
Where joint production by a team is undertaken, the individual effort of
each team member is difficult to evaluate solely on the basis of total
output. This creates an incentive for individual members to shirk. The
members recognize this, however, and therefore arrange ex ante for
someone "to specialize as a monitor to check the input performance of
team members."4 2  To ensure that the monitoring function will be
effective, they will give the monitor the right to instruct members and to
alter the composition of the team (hire and fire). Finally, as an incentive
to perform the monitoring function efficiently, the monitor will be
assigned the residual claim to the team's profits. These and other rights43
together create the internal contractual structure of the firm. According
38 A.A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization"
(1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777.
39 Ibid.
40 According to Alchian and Demsetz, "[t]o speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers
to various tasks is a deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in
renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties": ibid. at 777.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. at 781.
43 Summarized ibid. at 783 and 794.
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to Alchian and Demsetz, "the arrangement is simply a contractual
structure subject to continuous renegotiation with the [monitor]." 44
The limitations of the Alchian and Demsetz analysis have been
described elsewhere.45 Generally, it is thought to be constrained by its
own terms. Apart from that, however, and notwithstanding their initial
objection to such a characterization, Alchian and Demsetz seem only to
reproduce the control conception of the firm. The utility they attribute
to their monitor, or "central agent," seems very much to depend on the
right to give instructions on "what to do and how to do it."46 The
function of their monitor, ultimately, is to direct production. The
control of production opportunism is only one aspect of that function.47
It would appear, in this regard, that Alchian and Demsetz missed
the important analytical fact when dismissing the view that the firm is
characterized by the power to direct human capital. An initial
observation is that employees do not refuse to accept direction. They do
what is asked of them, and they do so for very good reasons. 48 More
fundamentally, it is quite irrelevant that employees can, and sometimes
do, refuse to obey. So long as they do follow instructions, the control
structure will exist. While they remain employed, the firm will operate as
an arrangement through which control is exercised over both physical
and human capital. This will be the case even in the Alchian and
Demsetz model. It is of no concern, at this point, that the structure may
conceivably collapse in whole or in part.49 Recognizing this indicates that
the Alchian and Demsetz firm is more than a set of ordinary market
contracts. It is a set of contracts that create a structure by subjecting
44 Ibid. at 794. Demsetz subsequently notes that "[a]bating the cost of shirking helps explain
the firm's inner organization but provides no rationale for the firm's existence": supra note 2 at 152.
45 See Holmstrdm and Tirole, supra note 8 at 66-74; Jensen and Meckling, infra note 50 at
310; and Demsetz, ibid.
46 Supra note 38 at 782.
47 Identification of the control of production opportunism as the reason for the existence of
firms is a significant difference between the Alchian and Demsetz model and those of Williamson
and Hart who point to exchange opportunism.
48 First, there are substantial costs involved in obtaining new employment, which employees
will not incur simply to demonstrate their ultimate personal autonomy. Second, the value of their
labour capital is often greatest to their current employer. Third, they make personal investments in
co-workers and neighbours. For these and other reasons, workers tend to perform their
employment contracts. Note, in this regard, that Demsetz subsequently appears to have accepted
the durability of employment relationships: supra note 2 at 150.
49 The Alchian and Demsetz criticism is not entirely without significance. It indicates another
way in which control can fail. Workers may refuse to obey, for example, because of the personality
or management style of their employer. If they do refuse, production will be disrupted.
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assets to the control of a given actor. As we shall see, at least Demsetz
appears to have moved towards this latter view.
C. The Nexus Argument
Jensen and Meckling, in a paper examining the agency cost
tradeoffs between debt and equity capitalization, agreed with the
Alchian and Demsetz objection to the view that firms are characterized
by authority, and accepted their insistence on contracting as the proper
emphasis50 They pursued this emphasis in their general abstraction of
the "nexus" view of the firm:
It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legalfictions which serve as
a nexusfor a set of contracting relationships among individuals ...
Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are
"inside" the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are "outside" of it.
There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts)
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labour, material and capital inputs
and the consumers of output.5 1
The nexus of contracts idea, in part for its supposed ideological content,
has been elevated to the status of a theory of the firm in recent years.
This has occurred in spite of the fact that it amounts to no more than an
unhelpful preliminary analysis in the Alchian and Demsetz paper, and
an undeveloped assertion in the Jensen and Meckling paper. Jensen and
Meckling themselves admit that the idea "has little substantive
content,"5 2 and they essentially ignored the construct in their subsequent
analysis.5 3
The difficulty with this idea appears in its assertion. It may be
conceded that the firm is a "nexus of contracts," as it obviously is in the
sense contemplated by Jensen and Meckling. However, this only returns
us to a sort of "black box" notion of the firm where nothing "inside" the
firm is seen to be of special significance. The main feature of the nexus
idea is that the "firm" has no boundaries, that contractual ubiquity or
50 M.C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 J.Fin. Econ. 305 at 310.
51 ibid. at 310-11.
5 2 Ibid. at 311.
53 The appeal of the construct to Jensen and Meckling may be its presumed congeniality to
their subsequent analysis, where debt and equity are seen to be substitutable regimes for the
regulation of agency costs. It allows them to formulate their approach without reference to the
traditional view that debt is "outside" the firm while equity is "within."
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indifference precludes theoretical fencing or partitioning. This notion is
obviously at odds with the usual physical perception of the firm as a
bounded structure. The difficulty again appears to be one of focus. Like
Coase before them, Jensen and Meckling focused on exchanges at the
interface of production technologies. As a result, when they perceive
that exchanges are negotiated whether the actor chooses to produce or
to purchase, their conclusion is exchange or contractual continuity. But
this picture of contractual continuity obscures the real boundaries
defined by the distinct production control of different actors. When that
deeper control investigation is made, the institutional boundedness of
the firm we perceive can be explained. Absent some formal or symbolic
boundary, we demarcate production according to the hand which directs
it. That is, the scope of the firm is congruent with the control a
particular actor has acquired through contracts for production control.5 4
In focusing solely on the exchange interface, Jensen and Meckling have
failed to account for the institutions or structures that exchange can
create. Ironically, while according primacy to contractual exchange, they
failed to recognize the full extent of its power.
D. The Transaction CostArgument (Williamson)
At the same time the nexus argument was being developed,
Oliver Williamson was working to "operationalize" the Coasean view
that transaction cost differences determined the choice between market
and firm.55 According to Williamson, "this entailed (1) identifying the
microanalytic factors that are responsible for transaction cost differences
among transactions, (2) aligning transactions with governance structures
in a discriminating way, and (3) discovering and respecting the crucial
intertemporal process features that predictably attend economic
organization."5 6 Williamson has in fact pursued this agenda with
54 All contracts are exchanges and are fungible in that sense. However, the content of each
contract must be examined. Some will involve purchases of finished goods, some will involve
purchases of factors to be used in the production of other goods. The latter type of conitract brings
production within the firm when the actor proceeds to direct the combination of factors.
55 See O.E. Williamson, "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations" (1971) 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 112; and O.E. Williamson, "Markets and Hierarchies:
Some Elementary Considerations" (1973) 63 Am. E.on. Rev. 316.
56 O.E. Williamson, "The Logic of Economic Organization" (1988) 4 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 65
at 66.
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broader strokes than Coase,5 7 and his transaction cost economics is now
a capacious analytical framework purporting to have application to a
variety of diverse phenomena 5 8 The approach, although not
uncontested,59 has been influential in the literature.
Williamson's approach begins with two behavioural assumptions.
The first is that of bounded rationality, the notion that individuals are
"intendedly rational, but only limitedly so."60 The major consequence of
this assumption is that complete contracts cannot be written. His second
-assumption is that, where credible commitments are lacking,61
individuals are prone to opportunism, a condition "of self-interest
seeking that contemplates guile."'62 Given these two assumptions,
Williamson sees the issue as one of determining how to "organize
economic activity so as to economize on bounded rationality while
simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in question against the
hazards of opportunism."63
Williamson operationalizes the transaction cost approach in the
following way. A transaction can be carried out in the market, within the
firm, or through hybrid structures. These "governance structures"64
differ in their costs and adaptive capacities. As well, the transactions
themselves have different dimensions. They may differ in the frequency
with which they occur, the degree of uncertainty to which they are
subject, and the degree of asset specificity attaching to them.
Recognizing this, Williamson's approach is to "align transactions (which
differ in their attributes) with governance structures (the costs and
57 Williamson, supra note 8. Williamson's breadth begins with his wide definition of
transaction costs. See the objection by Demsetz, supra note 2 at 144-45.
58 These phenomena range from vertical integration to career marriages. See O.E.
Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics" in Schmalensee & Willig, supra note 6, 135.
59 Critical commentary includes Demsetz, supra note 2; Milgrom & Roberts, infra note 111;
and G.K. Dow, "The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics" (1987) 8 J. Econ.
Behavior & Organ. 13, along with the response by O.E. Williamson in "Transaction Cost
Economics: The Comparative Contracting Perspective" (1987) 8 J. Econ. Behavior & Organ. 617.
60 The phrase is Herbert A. Simon's in Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision.Making
Processes in Administrative Organization, 2d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1961) xxiv.
61 See Williamson, supra note 8 at c. 7; and O.E. Williamson "Credible Commitments" (1983)
73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519.
62 Williamson, supra note 56 at 68. Williamson notes that "this self-interest seeking attribute
is variously described as opportunism, moral hazard and agency": supra note 58 at 139.
63 Williamson, supra note 56 at 68.
64 The notion that serial contracting is a "governance structure" is perhaps counterintuitive.
Williamson means governance in the wide sense of a scheme of interaction.
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competencies of which differ) in a discriminating (mainly, transaction
cost economizing) way." 65
Williamson's first application of this approach was to vertical
integration. 66 In his view, it is the paradigm case6 7 and it is the
application of particular interest here. Because bounded rationality
makes it impossible to write a complete contract, some other device
must be employed to allow for adaptation to changing conditions over
time. The devices that might be used are the short-term contract or
vertical integration.68 Usually, because its high-powered incentives69
constrain bureaucratic costs better, the short-term contract will be the
efficient device for the acquisition of general-purpose assets.70 However,
as asset specificity7l increases, a "fundamental transformation" occurs in
which ex ante large numbers bidding is transformed ex post into bilateral
bargaining. 72 Exchange opportunism becomes a problem and this limits
the serviceability of the short term contract. 73 Internalization of the
transaction (vertical integration) then becomes the more efficient
choice.
The question at this point is how internalizing the transaction
avoids or reduces the prospect of opportunism. It has been pointed out
elsewhere that Williamson has not clearly explained the mechanism
65 Supra note 56 at 73.
66 Williamson, supra note 8 at c. 4-6; and supra note 58 at 150ff.
6 7 Williamson, supra note 56 at 73.
68 Williamson, supra note 58 at 150.
69 According to Williamson, "by high-powered incentives, I have reference to residual
claimant status whereby an agent, either by agreement or under the prevailing definition of property
rights, appropriates a net revenue stream, the gross receipts and/or cost of which stream are
influenced by the efforts expended by the economic agent": supra note 8 at 132.
70 Williamson, supra note 58 at 151.
71 Asset specificity is a key element in Williamson's approach and is explained in most of his
publications. Generally, an asset is more "specific" to a use the less its value in alternative uses. He
has identified several kinds of asset specificity: see O.E. Williamson, "Comparative Economic
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives" (1991) 36 Admin. Sci. Q. 269 at
281-82.
72 Williamson, supra note 8 at 61-63.
73 See O.E. Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations" (1979) 22 J. Law & Econ. 233 at 241-42, 251; Williamson, supra note 8 at 76; and
Williamson, supra note 58 at 151. See also B. Klein, R.G. Crawford & A.A. Alchian, "Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process" (1978) 21 J. Law &
Econ. 297.
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involved.7 4 Williamson offers only vague references to internal
adaptations being effected by fiat,75 or carried out in a sequential way
without the need to revise inter-firm contracts. 76 Nevertheless, a
mechanism can be identified. It is implicit in the idea of a fundamental
transformation. The exchange opportunism problem arises for short-
term contracts because a highly specific investment creates a bilateral or
small-numbers bargaining situation at the contract renewal stage. 77
Vertical integration can avoid this problem by internalizing the
transaction and thereby moving the contracting interface backward (or
forward) one or more stages where the new transaction does not involve
a high degree of asset specificity. This returns the parties to a large-
numbers bidding position where opportunism is attenuated or
eradicated. Williamson's argument works, accordingly, because of the
control nature of the firm. The control device provides a solution to the
problem of exchange opportunism by eliminating the vulnerable
exchange.78
Williamson's analysis of the limits on firm size is also broadly
consistent with a control conception of the firm. Vertical integration
does not proceed indefinitely, according to Williamson, because there
are costs associated with increasing size.79 He first describes the
arguments that firm size is limited by uncertainty, control losses, growth,
organizational capital, and the deadlines and delays of hierarchies.80 He
discounts these arguments on the ground that they do not take into
account the possibility of selective intervention in the integrated unit.8 l
He goes on to conclude, however, that selective intervention is not
feasible. Interestingly, although he reaches this conclusion, he does not
concede the significance of the arguments ostensibly challenged by the
74 See 0. Hart, "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm" (1989) 89 Colum.
LR. 1757 at 1763 and infra note 85 at 692-93.
75 Williamson, supra note 8 at 76.
76 See Williamson, supra note 73 at 253.
7 7 Exchange opportunism by a supplier is likely to occur only where the actor is, for some
reason, unable to negotiate a contract identical to the original with some other supplier.
78 Williamson's view is that integration will tend to be the efficient solution only in cases
where asset specificity is very high-where goods "become very close to unique": supra note 8 at 92.
79 Ibid. at 131-62.
80 Ibid. at 133-35.
81 Ibid.
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possibility of selective intervention.8 2 Instead, Williamson identifies
certain other bureaucratic costs as constraining firm size.83 He argues
that, "[a]s compared with market organization, internal organization
displays a differential propensity to manage complexity, to forgive error,
and to engage in logrolling."8 4 These costs, although again Williamson
is not very clear about them, are at least partly due to the failure of
control processes (e.g., over-managing, rent-seeking). Where they
appear to have no association with control failure, their significance
remains unclear. Thus, to the extent Williamson has been able to
demonstrate a limiting constraint, his analysis tends to support the idea
of the firm as a control structure.
E. The Residual Control Argument
In an initial article co-authored with Sanford Grossman85 and in
several subsequent articles,8 6 Oliver Hart argues that the firm is best
understood in terms of residual control rights.8 7 Hart defines a firm "to
consist of those [physical] assets that it owns or over which it has
control."88 He equates ownership with control and asserts a division of
contractual rights into "specific" control rights and "residual" control
rights.8 9 According to Hart, ownership of an asset is the condition of
possessing its associated residual control rights. An owner, except to the
extent that specific control rights are contracted away, has exclusive
authority to determine the use and disposition of the asset. He defines
vertical integration as "the purchase of the assets of a supplier (or of a
82 Presumably, if selective intervention is not feasible then such factors as control loss will
operate.
83 Williamson states that he would be surprised "if the principal limits to vertical integration
turn out to have nonbureaucratie origins": supra note 8 at 153.
8 4 Ibid at 149.
85 SJ. Grossman & 0. Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
Integration" (1986) 29 J. Law & Econ. 691.
86 See 0. Hart & J. Moore, "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm" (1990) 98 J. Pol.
Econ. 1119.
87 Hart's earlier work in the area was in the agency tradition. See SJ. Grossman & O.D. Hart,
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem" (1983) 51 Econometrica 7; and O.D. Hart, "The
Market as an Incentive Scheme" (1983) 14 Bell J. Econ. 366.
88 Grossman & Hart, supra note 85 at 693.
89 ibid. at 692.
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purchaser) for the purpose of acquiring the residual rights of control." 90
Positioning these definitions in a world of incomplete contracting and
opportunism, Hart's thesis is that residual control matters because it
affects what happens in events not covered by the contract. Residual
control rights, because they determine the usage of assets, "affect ex post
bargaining power and the division of ex post surplus in a relationship"
and therefore ex ante investment and effort decisions. 91
Hart identifies opportunism as a primary influence on the
decision to integrateY2 The scope of conduct he includes in that notion,
however, is wider than that included by Williamson. Hart does not
require guile. His idea of opportunism is self-interested conduct. This is
illustrated in his main example dealing with whether an insurance
company or insurance agency will own the client list, or, in different
terms, whether the list will be integrated by the company.93 Where the
company owns the list, in his analysis, the agency may suffer if the
company decides that "it does not want to insure automobiles in a
particular region" and so raises its prices, lowers the quality of its
services, or changes the type and quality of its advertising in that
region.9 4 Alternatively, where the agency owns the list, it might
encourage its clients "to switch to other companies if this seems
advantageous," presumably because it will be more profitable to itself or
its clients. 95 In neither case, it will be appreciated, is guile operating.
The actor is simply doing what is expected given the profit-maximizing
imperative. These are regular business decisions. Hart's assumption is
that the parties will take the prospect of such conduct into account in
their ex ante decision whether to integrate. In other words, they will seek
protection from harmful business judgments of the other party, as well
as from opportunism.
Hart and Williamson both argue that fear of holdouts (exchange
opportunism) can be a motivation for integration. However, when Hart
goes beyond that to include the possibility of adverse business
judgments, he identifies a distinctly different motivation. Self-interest
with guile is different from mere self-interest. In the former case, the
question is whether the behaviour will occur. In the latter case, the
90 Ibid. at 716.
91 Hart, supra note 13 at 1766.
92 Hart & Moore, supra note 86 at 1120.
93 Supra note 85.
94 Ibid. at 712.
95 Ibid. at 713.
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behaviour is expected. The probability of guile, moreover, is something
which can be evaluated in the present as a function of character and
reputation. The probability of adverse self-interest, on the other hand,
depends on changes in the market in the future that alter the self-
interested party's original incentives to contract. Finally, mere self-
interest involves a bona fide refusal to contract on the former terms.
Distinguishing these motivations, it should be apparent, has the effect of
discounting an exclusive reliance on opportunism to explain integration.
Although Hart might define the second type of behavior as
opportunism, 96 he has actually generalized his approach. The ex ante
allocation of residual control now depends on two factors: the possibility
of opportunism (as traditionally understood), and the possibility of mere
adverse self-interest. This implies that his approach can be further
generalized, assuming it is a valid approach to begin with, to other
motivations that might operate.
Hart's analysis, generally, was prompted by what he regarded as
the failure of the existing literature to explain the mechanism through
which vertical integration provides relief from the costs of
opportunism.97 He deals specifically with Williamson's proposition that
the advantage of the firm is its resolution of disputes by fiat.
98
According to Hart, "Williamson does not spell out in precise terms the
mechanism by which this reduction in opportunism occurs." 99 Hart's
object is to suggest what that mechanism is. His argument is that the
allocation of residual control determines relative bargaining power
(which he links with the ability to act opportunistically) and therefore
the division of surplus at the recontracting stage. The parties involved
recognize this. Accordingly, where an asset is specific to one of them,
the prospect of opportunism (by the other party) will motivate that party
96 At that point, opportunism would take on the wide meaning of simply identifying and
pursuing opportunities. Guile would be analytically irrelevant.
9 7 Supra note 85 at 692-93; and supra note 13 at 1763.
98 Williamson sees a number of benefits to integration and Hart acknowledges this elsewhere:
see Hart, "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm" (1988) 4 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 119 at
135.
99 Hart, supra note 13 at 1763.
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to integrate the asset.100 The process here is the incentive effect ex ante
of the expost use of residual control rights to act opportunistically. 10 1
Hart's analysis describes the operation of the incentive effect, it
does not describe the mechanism through which control solves the
problem. As observed earlier in the discussion of Williamson's
approach, the mechanism involved is the avoidance of the opportunism
problem by moving the contracting interface to a competitive (large-
numbers) market.1 °2 This is the advantage of integration in relation to
the problem of exchange opportunism in markets. Hart alludes to this
view of the mechanism in one of his later papers but regards it,
ambiguously, as [merely?] "consistent with the broad perspective
provided by the notion of residual rights of control."103 In terms of the
foregoing analysis, the "consistency" is to be found in the serial
connection between the mechanism and its incentive effect. Knowing
that moving the contracting interface to a competitive market can
reduce the prospect of exchange opportunism, the actor has an incentive
to integrate.
Hart distinguishes his approach from others by its appeal to
residual control rights over physical assets. This properly tends to
discount the analytical significance of such things as ownershipper se and
the method of payment.1 ° 4 At the same time, however, it fails to account
for the control of human capital except incidentally or in a derivative
way.105 This is problematic since casual observation suggests that
control of workers is a significant aspect of many firms. Hart's analysis
fails in this respect because of its very reliance on "residual" control.
Hart made a distinction between specific and residual control,
and then chose the wrong one. "Residual" control, in an important
100 According to Hart, "integration shifts the incentives for opportunistic and distortionary
behaviour, but it does not remove these incentives": supra note 85 at 716. But this would not be the
case if integration involves a shift to a competitive interface.
101 Both the problem and its solution are conceived in terms of the incentive effects of
control. An allocation of residual control rights that would create opportunities for holdouts would
provide the wrong incentives to the other party. The solution is to make an allocation that avoids or
restricts such incentives.
102 See, above, text accompanying notes 77-78.
103 Hart, supra note 98 at 136.
104 Grossman & Hart, supra note 85 at 694-95.
105 Hart continuously returns to this aspect of his approach: see ibid. at 717; supra note 13 at
1770-71; and supra note 86 at 1121 and 1150.
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sense, is meaningless. 10 6 By definition, residual control is just the
specific control one has not contracted away. Consider, in this regard,
that one person's residual control will be the "specific" control
purchased from a prior holder of residual control who retained some
control rights. In such cases, in Hart's dichotomy, the same set of rights
is contemporaneously "specific" and "residual" control. It would seem
that "residual" control only has meaning if one person has rights that we
might usually associate with "ownership;" that is, if we intellectually
privilege one person's rights over those of another. This would be an
implausible economic construction given that some "specific" rights (e.g.,
the right to use a truck for five years) can have far greater economic
significance than the "residual rights" (e.g., the right to dispose of the
truck at the end of the period.
An examination of the integration process also illustrates this. If
exchange opportunism is potentially a problem, an actor can choose to
produce the specific asset, for example, a unique tractor-trailer
pressurized refrigeration unit to deliver a rare gas produced by the actor.
When acquiring the means to produce this good, however, not all of the
factors need be purchased. The tractor, the flatbed trailer on which the
refrigeration tank is mounted, and the refrigerator itself may all be
leased in competitive markets. The special technology required to
regulate the pressure and temperature of the gas (a computer program)
may be licensed from a software company which retains the right to sell
it to others. In this stylized example, virtually the whole finished asset is
created out of a combination of "specific" control rights. Specific
control, in the case of each of these factors, is all the actor requires in
order to move the contractual interface to competitive markets and
thereby avoid opportunism. The actor has solved the problem through
the ex ante allocation of "specific" control rights. Even if these factors
had been purchased outright, the problem would still have been solved
by specific rights since only the right to use the factor was actually
employed.
The proposition that "specific" control is the relevant analytical
concept, unlike Hart's approach, accommodates human capital.
Workers, like lessors and licensors, sell only some of their specific rights.
They grant their employer the right, within defined limits, to direct their
labour. To the extent they do this, their labour capital is integrated.
They retain their "residual" (other) control rights to employ their labour
106 Hart's use of the "residual" label may be distinguished from the the common
understanding of a "residual claim." In the latter case, the "residual" label refers to the variability
of the claim. The control characterized as residual control is definite, not variable.
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capital as they see fit (e.g., to read, garden, stay out late). Their
employer does not require these other specific control rights and does
not integrate them into the production unit.
There is a consideration involved in the integration of human
capital, however, that does not arise in the case of physical capital. It is
the fact that employers cannot hold on to the labour capital of
workers.1 07 An actor cannot enforce a specific right to determine when
a worker's employment will end. This constraint, it will be appreciated, is
not inherent in the economic relationship given that, at one time, an
actor could enforce a specific right to insist on the continuing labour of
the worker (i.e., slavery). Rather, the constraint is legally imposed as a
matter of public policy. This, it must be emphasized, does not discount
the utility of a control analysis in relation to human capital. Instead, it
confirms it. If workers cannot be compelled to work, the control analysis
would predict that there will be holdout problems with labour generally.
This is what appears to happen in reality. Thus, the analysis indicates
that control (the firm) does not solve the problem of human capital
exchange opportunism (it can not, as a matter of law), and this
corresponds with the fact that it remains a problem within firms. Devices
other than control (e.g., compensation design) must be employed. 108
The value of a control analysis is demonstrated another way in
the context of human capital. Both Williamson and Hart associate the
prospect of exchange opportunism with a condition of high asset
specificity. 09 However, the great majority of workers do not exhibit high
asset specificity and yet are controlled by their employers. This tends to
suggest that the significance of asset specificity is overstated. If that is so,
exchange opportunism based on high asset specificity is brought into
question as a motivation for integration 0 A general analysis of control
rights, however, allows for this. Control is a device which can be used
advantageously for a variety of purposes. If exchange opportunism is
suspect as a primary motivation, there may be some other benefit to
integrating human capital. One possibility is that control over workers is
required in order to transmit the value of an actor's comparative
advantage to actual production. The actor knows the most efficient way
107 This is Hart's reason for not including control of human capital directly within his analysis:
see references supra note 105.
108 Other devices will also be ineffective to control exchange opporttnism. Monitoring (in
combination with the dismissal sanction), for example, is primarily a device to control production
opportunism.
109 Williamson explicitly develops the notion of human asset specificity: supra note 71.
110 Consider the views of Klein et aL, supra note 73 at 313-16.
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to carry on production (what, where, when, and how) and maintains this
efficiency by directing the workers accordingly. There may be other
control motivations. The point is that the notion of the firm as a
polyfunctional control structure expands the analytical framework in a
useful way. There can be situational explanations for the integration of
human capital.
F. The Bargaining and Influence Cost Argument
Milgrom and Roberts accept the transaction cost approach to
the study of economic organization.111 They believe, however, that it
suffers from two conceptual problems. The first is its determination of
the total costs of a firm by the simplistic summation of production and
transaction costs. Milgrom and Roberts point out that, for example,
increased production costs may sometimes be incurred in order to
reduce transaction costs. They therefore insist that production and
transaction costs be considered together.11 2 The second conceptual
problem, in their view, is that "the general theory is too vague to be
useful. '113 In particular, the predictive power of transaction cost
economics is limited because there has been little elaboration of what
the relevant transaction costs arel
4
Milgrom and Roberts purport to enrich transaction cost analysis
in two ways.115 They first consider the costs of using the market to carry
out transactions. An initial formal analysis leads them to conclude that
the "efficiency of market arrangements is limited only by the costs of
negotiating efficient short-term contracts. 1 16 This conclusion, they
state, "points to the central importance of bargaining costs in
determining the efficiency of market transactions." 117 Asserting the
111 P. Milgrom & J. Roberts, "Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of
Economic Activity" in J.E. Alt & K.A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy
(Cambridge: Canbridge University Press, 1990) 57.
112 Ibid. at 57-58.
113 Ibid. at 58.
114 bid. at 70.
115 Their analysis, it would appear, is directed solely towards the second conceptual problem
they identified.
116 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 111 at 69.
117 Ibid. According to Milgrom and Roberts, this "accentuation of short-term bargaining
costs contrasts with received theory (as presented by Williamson), which emphasizes asset
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of dealings as the key factors": ibid. at 58.
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centrality of bargaining costs, however, only begins their analysis. To be
able to make specific predictions with the transaction cost approach, it is
necessary to identify the various types of bargaining costs and how they
vary with different circumstances.118 While Milgrom and Roberts define
bargaining costs expansively,119 they restrict their own analysis to the
costs of delays and failures to reach agreement.120 They identify three
costs: coordination failures, measurement activity, and undisclosed
preferences. Coordination failures occur when the complexity of a
market transaction prevents easy agreement between the parties. The
absence of an obvious "focal point"1 21 makes the coordination of their
demands difficult and leads to inefficient haggling or a failure to
agree.1 22 Measurement costs are the costs of measuring or evaluating a
good (e.g., its quality) prior to its purchase in the market. 23 The third
bargaining cost arises where parties strategically misrepresent their
actual preference for or valuation of a good.12 4 Milgrom and Roberts
argue that these costs are wasteful in many cases and, consequently, a
short-term contract might not be the most efficient way to arrange the
transaction. Other arrangements, such as vertical integration, may
economize on these costs.125
Milgrom and Roberts argue that "the crucial distinguishing
characteristic of a firm is not the, pattern of asset ownership but the
substitution of centralized authority for the relatively unfettered
negotiations that characterize market transactions."1 26 That is, they
understand the firm to be a device which solves problems through the
118 Ibid. at 61.
119 They write, ibid. at 65:
We interpret 'bargaining costs' expansively, just as we did the term 'transaction costs,' to
include all the costs associated with multilateral bargaining, competitive bidding, and
other voluntary mechanisms for determining a mutually acceptable agreement.
Bargaining costs include not only the wages paid to the bargainers or the opportunity
costs of their time, but also the costs of monitoring and enforcing the agreement and any
losses from failure to reach the most efficient agreement possible in the most efficient
fashion..
120 Ibid. at 72.
121 Kreps, infra note 134 at 121, describes a focal point as "some principle or rule individuals
use naturally to select a mode of behavior in a situation with many possible equilibrium behaviors."
1 2 2 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 111 at 72-75.
123 Ibid. at 75-77.
124 Ibid. at 77.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. at 72. See also 79.
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application of the control of the actor. It does this, in the case of
coordination failures, by eliminating the source of the problem. It is
simply no longer necessary for two parties to reach an agreement
(coordinate their demands). The actor alone deploys the assets 27 The
problems of measurement and undisclosed preferences are also
ameliorated or eliminated because a single actor now acts on both sides
of the transaction. The buyer and seller of the market are replaced by
the single actor of the firm. The bargaining costs of the market are
avoided by internalizing the transaction, making it subject to the control
of the actor.
Milgrom and Roberts next turn their attention to the costs of the
firm. Having analyzed how the costs, of bargaining make markets the
less efficient choice in some cases, they then consider how the costs of
centralized authority can make the firm an unattractive alternative.
They seek to explain, at this point, what limits the size of the firm.
Milgrom and Roberts identify two kinds of costs that accompany
increases in discretionary authority. The first kind "arises because those
with discretionary authority may misuse it."128 In fact, there are actually
two kinds of costs contemplated in this statement: that of over-
managing, and the quite distinct cost of production opportunism.
12 9
Milgrom and Roberts attribute these costs to flaws in the incentives,
intelligence, or character of those possessing discretionary authority.
30
The second type of cost Milgrom and Roberts associate with centralized
authority arises "even when the central authority is both incorruptible
and intelligent enough not to interfere in operations without good
reason."131 These are "influence costs,"132 and they "arise first because
individuals and groups within the organization expend time, effort, and
ingenuity in attempting to affect others' decisions to their benefit and
secondly because inefficient decisions result either directly from these
influence activities or, less directly, from attempts to prevent or control
127 Ibid. at 75.
128 Ibid. at 79.
129 bid. at 79-80.
130 Ibid. at 80.
131 Ibid.
132 See P. Milgrom & J. Roberts, "An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in
Organizations" (1988) 94 Am. J. Soc. (Supp.) S 154; and P. Milgrom, "Employment Contracts,
Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design" (1988) 96 J. Pol. Econ. 42.
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them."133 All of these costs, it should be apparent, represent failures in
the control process. Control is inefficient if it is excessive. It is also
inefficient if applied opportunistically, by those who have it, for personal
gain. Finally, it is inefficient where it is misdirected as a result of the
influence activity of interested parties. The costs of centralized
authority, accordingly, are the costs of control failure.
The rehabilitation of transaction cost economics proposed by
Milgrom and Roberts buttresses the view that both the advantages and
disadvantages of a firm are directly attributable to the operation of
control. A control structure can be the efficient arrangement where the
costs of using the market are high because it reduces or avoids these
costs. Conversely, control itself has limitations which restrict its
utilization and, hence, the size of the firm.
G. The Reputation/Corporate Culture Argument
Corporate culture, according to Kreps, can usefully be
understood in economic terms.13 4  Kreps turns initially to non-
cooperative game theory to develop the notion of the firm as a
reputation bearer 3S5 A firm has an interest in maintaining an open and
unambiguous reputation about the way in which it exercises authority.
This is because reputation is important for transactions that will
encounter unforeseen contingencies. Where these contingencies can
occur, a potential contracting party will want to have some idea ex ante
of how the firm will respond. An agreement will be made with the firm
that exhibits a reputation the content of which corresponds with the
needs of the contracting party.
Acquiring a reputation about how the firm will respond to
unforeseen contingencies involves choosing a decision rule or principle
and then following it. Kreps doubts that truly unambiguous and
universal rules exist. However, the literature on focal points indicates
to him that sufficiently unambiguous rules are possible.13 6 What is
1 3 3 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 111 at 80. Attempts to influence decisions can, of course,
be productive. Milgrom and Roberts have in mind influence activities that are directed towards the
realization of personal benefit without regard to firm benefit.
134 D.M. Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory" in Alt & Shepsle, supra note 111,
90.
135 For other discussions of the role of reputation, see Holmstr6m & Tirole, supra note 8 at
76-78; and Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 14 at 453.
13 6 Kreps, supra note 134 at 120-123 and 125.
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needed is a principle that "permits relatively efficient transactions to
take place and on which a viable reputation can be based."137 Having
selected such a principle, the task of the firm is to communicate that
principle to potential contracting parties. This is the role of corporate
culture. Kreps identifies corporate culture "with the principle and with
the means by which it is communicated." 138 Corporate culture gives all
parties "an idea ex ante how the organization will react to circumstances
as they arise; in a strong sense, it gives identity to the organization."
139
The functions performed by corporate culture appear to be
concerned with delineating and maintaining the control processes of the
firm. As we have seen, disclosure to potential contracting parties of the
basis on which decisions will be made in the future is a primary function
of corporate culture. Kreps also gives it a role in conveying the principle
to those (managers and workers) who undertake its actual application.1 40
This leads to consistency in decisions and avoids deterioration of the
principle itself. As well, by identifying proper performance where there
is an unforeseen contingency, corporate culture is a standard by which
the performance of those who exercise authority can be measured.1 41
Accordingly, in these respects, the corporate culture approach is
necessarily concerned with the question of control.
H. The Information Cost Argument
Although the Alchian and Demsetz "nexus" idea is often
referred to, its analytical utility has never been demonstrated in any
convincing way.142 Demsetz himself attributes this to the fact that "[t]he
defining content of the nexus of contracts [argument] remains rather
vague in literature on the theory of the firm." 143 Recognizing this, but
finding the transaction cost and agency approaches inadequate in certain
respects, 144 Demsetz has recently sought to rehabilitate the content of
13 7 bid. at 125.
138 Ibid. at 126.
139 ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 See, text accompanying notes 38-54.
143 Supra note 2 at 154-55.
144 Ibid. at 144-54.
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the nexus idea in terms of information costs.145 His goal is to
demonstrate "that information cost has relevance that extends beyond
its significance in transaction cost and moral hazard problems."146
Demsetz asks the question, "When is a nexus of contracts more
firm-like?"147 In his view, "specialization, continuity of association, and
reliance on direction are characteristics of firm-like coordination. 148
Specialization arises as a way to economize on the costs of producing,
maintaining, and using information. The benefit of specialization is
realized when others use it without incurring the costs of educating
themselves as to the information on which it is based. This occurs when
the specialist communicates by giving directions. Those who are to
make productive use of the information, but who are not specialists,
simply follow the directions.1 49  As Demsetz puts it, "direction
substitutes for education." 150 Demsetz also explains vertical integration
in terms of information costs. A firm will cease to vertically integrate at
that point where the increasing costs of information acquisition and
maintenance make the exploitation of information (the giving of
directions) infeasible.
This analysis puts considerable distance between Demsetz and
the original nexus idea. In asking when a nexus is more "firm-like," he is
contemplating, or moving very close to, the notion of the firm as a
bounded structure. Moreover, the arrangement he describes is explicitly
a control structure. Specialization per se is not a necessary attribute of
the arrangement. Continuity of association is also unnecessary, given
that directed persons can be employed in either long-term or short-term
relationships. This leaves only the giving of directions on an ongoing
basis as the essential feature of arrangements that are more "firm-like."
In the particular context of information costs, this control feature proves
to be advantageous. The mechanism of its operation is the substitution
145 Other works on the economics of information include J.E. Stiglitz, "Incentive, Risk, and
Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy" (1975) 6 Bell J. Econ. 552; and K.J. Arrow,
"Informational Structure of the Firm" (1985) 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 303.
146 Supra note 2 at 154.
14 71bid. at 155 [emphasis in original].
148 bid. at 156.
149 Consider, in this regard, the skilled worker (specialist) who is given directions. The
Demsetz argument works here as well. The worker may be viewed as a specialized product that can
be manipulated or instructed by the employer without the employer first acquiring the knowledge
possessed by the worker. The worker is a product that requires less information to use than to
produce. See the discussion of products by Demsetz: ibid. at 158.,
150 Ibid. at 157.
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of direction for education so as to economize on the acquisition and
maintenance of information.
IV. TRANSACTION COST CONSIDERATIONS
The foregoing arguments fall loosely into two general categories.
The monitor, residual control, reputation, and information cost
arguments are primarily grounded in production considerations. The
analyses of Coase, Williamson, and Milgrom and Roberts, on the other
hand, initially focus on transaction or bargaining considerations. Thus,
the two groups of analysts locate elementary significance in different
processes, in either production or exchange. No theoretical contest,
however, is necessarily implied by this dichotomy. The firm may be
perceived, and then defined, either in terms of its internal structure or by
reference to its boundaries. In the latter case, firm boundaries may be
defined either by the furthermost projection of the actor's control or,
alternatively, by the presence of exchange (negotiation). The two
phenomena operate on opposite sides of the boundary line and either
could therefore be regarded as definitive of that boundary. Recognizing
this makes it possible to understand how some economists have come to
regard exchange as characteristic of firms (e.g., as determinative of firm
size). At the same time, it should be apparent that an exchange is not
part of the firm but, rather, is an event found in the space between firms.
The presence of exchange is but a proxy for the absence of an actor's
control over production. As such, it is limited to derivative definition of
the firm. The nature of the firm itself is found in its internal structure, in
the application of control to the employment of assets.
While production and exchange are distinct processes, they are
also connected processes. Factors of production are acquired, and
product is distributed, through exchange. In addition, the size and type
of production may be altered by exchange. A full comprehension of the
overall economic structure of the firm therefore involves linking these
two processes together in a model in which firms are understood as
control structures separated from other control structures (other firms)
by the need to negotiate (exchange). Before proceeding to construct this
model, however, it is necessary to briefly consider the plausible scope of
the "transaction cost" approach.
There is a tendency among some economists to regard
transaction cost economics as exclusively important in the analysis of the
nature of the firm. This is seen in the occasional assertion that firms
would not exist but for transaction costs. The assertion is obviously
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wrong if it is suggesting that markets, even perfect markets, can
accomplish production on their own. Markets are unable to achieve, but
necessarily require, the production of goods. Markets would only
function without production if a finite set of pre-existing goods were
constantly circulated (bought and sold) without in any way being altered.
That is not what happens.
The difficulty with the assertion may be traced to the man to
whom it is usually attributed. Coase regarded the firm and the market as
alternative ways of allocating resources. He asked why an actor would
ever choose not to use the market. His reason was that there were costs
associated with the use of markets. A firm would therefore "arise," as
Coase put it, when its costs were less than the costs of the market. This
is the source of the subsequent confusion. It will be appreciated that the
firm only "arises" in relation to this particular actor. Prior to its
internalization by the actor, production had been carried on by some
other actor. That is, a firm existed, albeit not the firm of the particular
actor. In effect, there has been a shift of production from one actor to
another. Thus, although, in one sense a firm "arises," it is clearly not
correct to assert that there would be no firms in the absence of
transaction costs.
The assertion might nevertheless be thought to apply in the
integration context. The assumption involved would be that firms are
only combinations of technologies. Single technologies controlled by
single actors would not be firms. Instead, they would be mere factors of
production. The argument would be that integration beyond a single
technology would never occur if transaction costs were zero. It would
always be inefficient to combine technologies in a "firm." Hence, the
firm would never arise. The difficulty with this argument is that it
depends on the population of actors having constant abilities. It does not
account for the fact that different actors have different abilities. Some
actors will possess a comparative advantage over others and this
advantage may extend to a number of production technologies. For
example, an actor may have a comparative advantage in the production
of both good X and good Y. Because of that advantage, the actor will
choose to produce both goods. Thus, the combination of technologies
will come about (a "firm" will exist) even in the absence of transaction
costs.
There is another difficulty in regarding transaction cost
economics as a comprehensive or exclusive analytical framework. There
are two specific questions that most commentators address when
investigating the economic nature of the firm. They are: 1) why do firms
exist, and 2) what determines the size of the firm? Transaction cost
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proponents have a formally different answer for each question. Their
first answer is that firms exist because of transaction costs. Their
explanation for the size of firms, however, does not initially involve
transaction costs. Instead, they rely on what are primarily production
considerations. Coase identified diminishing returns to management,
Williamson identified bureaucratic costs, and Milgrom and Roberts
identified the costs of discretionary authority. Incurred in the course of
production, these costs limit the size of the firm when they exceed the
net transaction costs that otherwise would be expended. In this respect,
because it must rely on a production analysis, transaction cost economics
cannot claim exclusivity for its approach.
Perspective is also a problem for the transaction cost argument.
Making the "transaction" the basic unit of analysis concentrates
attention at the negotiation interface. The focus is on interactions
between firms and there is little consideration of actual production within
firms. This again is a black-box conception of the firm. Production
processes are treated as insignificant, uninteresting, or secondary
considerations and they tend to remain undeveloped within the
framework of the approach. In effect, transaction cost analysis stops
short of the firm. The major consequence of this is to continue to
obscure the mechanisms through which the firm proves to be an
advantageous device in a variety of circumstances.
One other observation may be made in connection with
transaction cost theorizing. Throughout the foregoing discussion, there
has been an insistence on a distinction between production and
exchange. Others might view this distinction as a semantic one, believing
that both exchange and production costs are contemplated in the idea of
transaction costs. The issue is indeed partly semantic, but not in the
trivial sense assumed. Language can clarify or obscure its subject-
matter. Where there is no material difference between two phenomena,
it serves no purpose to continue to identify them individually. On the
other hand, where there is a substantive difference, their linguistic
conflation obscures or submerges that difference, hindering its
comprehension, examination, and communication to others. The
difference between' production and exchange is substantive. It is the
difference between directing and agreeing-two fundamentally distinct
(but connected) processes. The claim that these are theoretically, and
therefore linguistically, equivalent "transactions" (the nexus of contracts
idea) only submerges what, in the present context, is analytically
significant. A firm begins and ends with the control a given actor is
entitled to exercise. An exchange is an interstitial event, it is not within
either of the exchanging firms. While each actor will direct assets in the
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process of exchanging, there can be no exchange without the agreement
of the other actor. Accordingly, the analytical distinction, and its
linguistic recognition, are required.
V. THE PRODUCION UNIT MODEL
Transaction cost considerations do not adequately explain the
firm. It is necessary to include production considerations in any model
purporting to have general theoretical application. Selecting the
production unit, rather than the transaction, as the basic analytical
construct allows for the accommodation of both production and
transaction costs and clarifies the operation of the different types of
integration. The factor that links these various elements is the control
actors exercise over the employment of assets.
The simplest production unit is the single individual who
expends effort in producing a good (whether a service or a tangible or
intangible asset). Each such production unit is composed of two
operating processes. The first is the actual production process; for
example, the manufacture of good Y. The production unit and its
associated production costs (p.c. (Y)) can be represented in the
following schematic way.
Figure 1
-> input p.c. (Y) output ->
The second process associated with every production unit is the
direction of exchange. An actor will employ assets to prepare for and
execute exchanges with other actors. At the anterior end of the
production process, the actor will incur transaction costs to acquire
inputs (the procurement function). Then, once production is complete,
the actor will incur transaction costs in the course of selling the output
(the marketing function).
[VOL. 33 NO. 1
The Economic Structure of the Firm
Figure 2
t.c. t.c.
(exchange) I p.C. (Y) I (exchange)
In a completely reduced (fully atomistic) economy, every firm would be
of this type (a sole proprietor or independent contractor). Each firm
would employ a single production technology and a single (or dual)
exchange technology in the course of interacting with other firms or
ultimate consumers. The exchange interaction between two firms would
be represented by distinct production units connected by an exchange.
An example would be the procurement of good X. The actor who
produces good X will incur a separate set of production and transaction
costs.
Figure 3
t.c. t.c. t.c. t.c.
- > input p~.(X) (exchange) P.C. (Y) Ioutput - >
Actor (X) Actor (Y)
A given production unit or firm will succeed or fail depending on
the efficiency of the control of the particular actor relative to all other
actors producing the same good. That is, the firm will succeed when the
actor has a "comparative advantage," or no comparative disadvantage,
relative to others. This advantage may be physical (e.g., a location
advantage) but more commonly will be found in the particular attributes
of each actor. Thus, the actor (e.g., an individual or a board of directors)
may have greater dexterity or a greater physical capacity for work. Or
the actor may have a comparative advantage in the cognition,
interpretation, manipulation, or application of information. These and
other attributes are applied in the course of the actor's effort or control
to affect both production costs and the two sets of transaction
(procurement and marketing) costs. The actor may be a better
producer, as well as negotiator, or the advantage in one capacity may
exceed the disadvantage in the other.
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There are time and information constraints on what an
individual actor can achieve. An actor may therefore employ human
capital (along with the requisite physical capital) to overcome these
constraints. The benefit of employing others is found in the direction or
control which guides their work. There may be a benefit, for example, in
a certain breadth of control physically or temporally unobtainable by the
actor alone. Economies of scale will be realized when the actor
horizontally expands control (through employment contracts) to a
production capacity that achieves the lowest average cost. These
economies may be obtainable, or approachable, in the case of both
production and transaction costs.
Even where economies of scale are not available (e.g., where
returns are constant) an actor can benefit from the control of others.
According to Demsetz, direction reduces information, costs through its
substitution for education. This is an observation about how control may
be valuable when extended beyond the physical capacity of the actor. It
is a specific manifestation of the fact that control is a means to exploit an
actor's comparative advantage by its transmission to production through
human capital. Another possibility is that control allows an actor to
exploit the comparative advantage of others, usually workers with skills
or expertise not possessed by the actor. Again, these possibilities would
potentially apply to both production costs and the two sets of transaction
costs. For example, constant returns to scale may be realized in the
transmission of an actor's superior information-processing skills to
production through several workers (educated or not) employed to assist
in the production of good Y. Additional value may be extracted by
employing a worker with a comparative advantage (relative to the actor)
in the marketing of good Y. Where the employment of human capital is
the norm, a further benefit may be realized if the actor has a
comparative advantage, relative to other actors, in managing workers.
The actor may possess a superior ability to instruct, schedule, motivate,
understand, or communicate with workers. Again, this advantage would
potentially extend to both production and transaction costs.
The constraints on an individual actor could also be overcome by
combination with other actors. That is, two or more individuals may act
together to control a particular production unit (e.g., a partnership). In
terms of the present analysis, the joint control of these individuals
identifies them as a single actor. Economies of scale and comparative
advantages can be exploited in this way, but the submission of each
individual to collective control creates for each a worker capacity distinct
from their controller capacity. These capacities are properly treated as
analytically separate. There is an actor (the group) that controls
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production through human capital (the individuals). Variations in the
control rights of particular individuals (e.g., where one partner has
exclusive control on a specific issue) can be treated in the same way.
The employment of additional human and physical capital (the
extension of the actor's control) will not proceed indefinitely. This is
because control itself has limitations. There have been several
suggestions as to why control fails or becomes inefficient as the scale of
production increases or becomes more complex. Among these are
control loss, managerial diseconomies, bureaucratic costs, influence
costs, and production opportunism. There have also been a number of
suggestions as to how control failure has been or could be ameliorated to
some extent. Structural changes, technological innovations, or
compensation design may expand the useful scope of control. From a
different perspective, Kreps sees "corporate culture" as a means to
reduce control failure by ensuring that the exercise of control is uniform
throughout an organization. These and other factors operate to
determine the upper limit of the useful application of control.
A number of general observations may be added at this juncture
to clarify this production unit picture of the firm. The first is that, except
in the integration sense, markets and firms are not alternative
governance regimes. Rather, they are complementary or dependent
elements in a regime of decentralized production. Exchange is
necessarily interposed between the production of different actors, and
each production unit has both production and transaction capacities.
The second observation is that the status of a given production unit
depends on whether it is subject to external control. A single individual
employing a single technology will be a "firm" when that individual
alone controls the technology. That same individual/technology will
cease to be a separate "firm" when it becomes subject to the direction of
another actor. It will then only amount to an additional factor of
production in the firm of the controlling actor. The final observation is
one of fundamental significance. It is that a firm can exist with or
without hierarchy. A single individual or group of co-equals may control
assets without the assistance of additional workers. The control that
defines the firm is therefore not synonymous or congruent with the
notion of hierarchy. The employment of hierarchical relations is a
common, but not immanent, feature of the firm. The firm derives its
essential character from the asset control of the actor, not the enlistment
or subjugation of human capital.
To this point in the discussion we have considered only the case
of a single production technology (along with its horizontal expansion).
We proceed now to extend the analysis to incorporate those instances
1995]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
where two or more production technologies are combined under the
control of a particular actor. These are the cases of vertical and
conglomerate integration.
Where an actor chooses to produce only good Y, it will be
necessary to purchase good X (the input) in the market. The actor will
therefore engage in an exchange with a firm that produces good X.
Each production unit will be controlled by a different actor.
Figure 4
t.c. t.c. t.c. t.c.
P.C. (X (exchange) P.C. MY
Actor (X) Actor (Y)
If the actor instead chooses to produce both good X and good Y
(i.e., vertically integrate), a good X production unit will be acquired by
merger or internal expansion and combined with the good Y production
unit. The costs of making an exchange at the interface between good X
and good Y will be eliminated, leaving instead the costs the actor incurs
in transferring good X into the good Y production process.
Figure 5
t.c. transfer cost t.c.
(exchange) I p.c. (X) r I p.c. (Y) I(exchange)
Actor
It will be observed that the vertical integration of good X involves the
creation of a control bridge between two technologically separable
production units. That is, when two or more successive technologies are
combined, the control of their common actor represents a bridge
between them.
An actor may alternatively choose to produce an unrelated good
(good U) in addition to good Y. This is the case of conglomerate
integration. Here there is neither an exchange nor a transfer
relationship between the combined production units. The actor's
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control, however, again creates a bridge, this time between
technologically unrelated production units.
Figure 6
t.c. t.c. t.c. t.c.
(no exchange
P.C. (U) or transfer) p.c. (Y)
Actor
We will examine the motives for the various types of integration
below. Initially, however, it is worth focussing on the fact that
conglomerate integration does not involve the replacement of an
exchange. The production units are not technologically related in a
successive way. There is no exchange or transfer interface between
them. Accordingly, transaction cost economics cannot explain this type
of integration in the Coasean sense of fiat replacing the price mechanism
where it is less costly. The explanation for conglomerate integration
resides elsewhere. It becomes conspicuous, as do the explanations for
other types of integration, when integration is conceived generally in
terms of the combination of production units.
Consider first the control bridge established upon a vertical
integration. There are several explanations for why an actor would
choose to create this bridge. Some of these explanations implicate the
bridge itself as the source of the benefit to the actor. Other explanations
locate the source of the benefit in the manipulation of the production
and exchange technologies of the acquired production unit rather than
the bridge per se and, for that reason, provide general explanations for
all types of integration. A pure transaction cost explanation is an
example of the former variety. The control bridge removes transaction
costs by positioning the actor at both ends of the former exchange.
Haggling costs or unrecognized focal points are no longer a concern.
Here the bridge itself is the source of the benefit. Another explanation
that points to the bridge as the source of the benefit is the desire to
reduce production uncertainty by ensuring the supply of an input. The
actor relies on the control bridge to protect the good Y production unit
from foreseen and unforeseen supply shortages of good X or
terminations of supply relationships for other reasons. The exchange
opportunism explanation (a variation of the supply argument) is another
example of this type. The bridge is itself beneficial because it moves the
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contractual interface to a competitive market and thereby reduces the
opportunism threat. Nothing about the technology of the acquired
production unit, in each of these cases, is motivating the actor to
integrate.
We have reviewed some of the explanations that are specific to
successive production. Other explanations are general. They flow from
the fact that the control bridge puts the actor in a position to affect the
production and exchange technologies of the acquired production unit.
The nature of the effect will depend on the physical and information
attributes of the actor and, where human capital is employed, the success
with which the actor handles workers, transmits a comparative
advantage, or exploits the advantages of others. Thus, an actor may
integrate backward, forward, or horizontally to realize on the value of
the slack thought to be present in the target production unit. This action
does not find its impetus in the bridge per se. The actor is instead relying
on a perceived superior ability to restrain production opportunism. This
is also the case where the actor is relying on a comparative advantage as
the motive for integration. It is the more efficient manipulation of the
technology of the acquired production unit that is the source of the
benefit. The bridge itself does not motivate the actor. It serves only as
the means by which the advantage in the acquired technology can be
exploited.
These general explanations would also apply in the conglomerate
integration context. An actor may integrate unrelated technologies in
order to extract the value previously lost to production opportunism or
to exploit a comparative advantage. The bridge is not the source of the
benefit. The actor benefits from the direct application of control to the
acquired production and exchange technologies, and not from the
simple control combination of the production units. There may be an
explanation for conglomeration, however, that does implicate the bridge.
The explanation is that conglomerate firms arise from a desire to
diversify risk. The objection to this argument is that diversification could
be arranged through appropriate personal investments in the market. It
may be, however, that the actor prefers to diversify into investments that
can be controlled. Where that is the case, the primary source of the
benefit is the insurance function of the bridge rather than the
manipulation of the technology of the acquired firm.
Horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate integration may,
alternatively, be explained by the exploitation of economies of scope.
Here the relevant production relationship is secondary. The integrated
technologies may or may not be related in a primary way. Thus, for
example, an actor may horizontally integrate in order to acquire a local
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brand name to use to market the comparable products of the original
firm. Or vertical integration may occur so as to make use of the heat
produced by the neighboring technology. Finally, an actor may acquire
an unrelated technology (conglomerate integration) in order to use its
office, marketing, or distribution network. An insurance company, for
example, might acquire a credit card company or department store chain
through which it can extend the promotion of its products. The control
bridge, in all of these circumstances, is the source of a secondary
production or exchange technology benefit.
Disintegration is explained in the same terms. All of the various
explanations for integration are in fact arguments about what motivates
the actor. The actor, however, may have misjudged the benefit of
acquiring control. The comparative advantage may not exist or the
prospect of exchange opportunism may have actually increased. The
actor may not be able to reduce information costs or to obtain
economies of scale or scope. Alternatively, the size or complexity of the
firm may lead to control failure in any of a number of ways. In all of
these circumstances, there is an incentive for the actor to reduce or
dispose of one or more technologies.
It is perhaps worth observing at this point that it is the net costs
of control that are determinative for all types of integration and
disintegration. Even in those cases where the control bridge itself is a
source of benefit, integration may still not occur. This is because the
benefit of the bridge will be assessed against the potential cost (or
benefit) associated with the fact that the actor now controls the
production and transaction costs of the acquired production unit. If the
actor's control increases these costs beyond the benefit of the bridge,
integration will be inefficient. For example, where a bridge is
established, the costs of transfer between production units may be less
than the costs of the former exchange. An additional benefit may be
realized if the bridge also reduces the cost of exchange opportunism.
These benefits, however, may not exceed the increase in the production
and transaction costs, relative to the independent state, resulting from
the actor's comparative disadvantage in relation to the production and
exchange technologies of the acquired production unit. Thus, it will
always be necessary to examine the total net costs of the independent
and integrated states of the production units.
It might also be appreciated at this point that the production unit
analysis identifies the boundaries of a firm (i.e., its size) as congruent
with the scope of the control of a particular actor. This can be
understood in terms of the collection of production units controlled by
the actor or, in more abstract terms, the collection of individual control
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contracts negotiated by or for the actor which supply the operative
physical and human capital. The absence of exchange or transfer
relationships between commonly controlled production units (i.e.,
conglomerate firms) does not alter these boundaries. On the other
hand, it is possible for formal boundaries to be erected. The standard
formal boundary is created by incorporation. Thus, an actor can isolate
production units from each other by assigning them to separate
corporate forms. This is an important effect and is the subject of much
legal analysis. Interestingly, in that regard, the control principle also
applies at the level of the formal construction to determine the
boundaries of the corporate firm. Moreover, in some cases of external
control the control principle overrides the formal boundary. In any
event, for present purposes, it is sufficient to confirm the consistent
appeal to control to establish the boundaries of all firms.
The foregoing analysis indicates that the firm is usefully
understood in terms of the costs and benefits of an actor's control over
the employment of assets. This conclusion is not undermined by the
claim that all of the benefits of the firm could be secured through market
purchases if transaction costs were zero. The reason this is so, quite
apart from the plausibility of the claim, is that the analysis is intended to
provide a framework that is comprehensive. It seeks to accommodate, in
a single model, the various factors that apply at the production stage as
well as at the exchange interface. Focussing on the production unit, and
on exchanges and transfers between production units, achieves this.
Doing so, however, does not preclude a more restricted enquiry. The
model, in fact, anticipates this. The identification of a number of
relevant variables contemplates their individual manipulation while
holding the remaining variables constant. Thus, for example, the model
allows for an investigation of the effect of holding production or
transaction costs constant across production units. Similarly, in the
immediate context, it allows for an investigation of the effect of reducing
transaction costs to zero. In this way, the proposition that integration
would not occur where transaction costs are zero is simply an assertion
about what the model (i.e., the world) would look like when the
transaction cost variable is held constant at zero. This is how all multi-
variable models are utilized. Carrying out the exercise under this model,
it will be observed, does not result in the conclusion that firms do not
exist where transaction costs are zero. The conclusion is instead that the
economy becomes fully atomistic (or fully disintegrated), where each
technology is represented by a single firm or set of firms. Each
production unit is a firm, but no production unit is integrated, whether
vertically or in a conglomerate firm. Apart from the exercise itself,
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however, the point is that the model is a construct with which to organize
the variables that may have application in the context of the firm. The
construct would fail to be analytically useful only if it were unable to
accommodate all of the relevant variables or credibly identify the source
and mechanism of their individual or combined application.
VI. CONCLUSION
The firm is a structure through which production is made to
occur. The structure is created in markets but subsequently exists, in a
substantive way, apart from them. Some economists will dispute this.
They find their explanation for the firm primarily in market
considerations or in terms of the exchange interface. This fails, however,
to provide a comprehensive picture of the firm. Production is what firms
do. A complete understanding of the firm must necessarily proceed
from that observable fact. Production is the process of exercising control
over the employment of assets. It includes the creation of the control
structure and its engagement in both exchange and production.
Appreciating this involves discovering and assessing the benefits and
structural limitations of control, including the associated technological
and bridge-based motives for combined production. The task involves
selecting the production unit as the basic analytical construct and then
exploring the sources and mechanisms of the various factors said to
affect the operation or combination of production units. The result is a
model that accommodates human capital, single technology and
integrated firms, production and transaction cost considerations, and the
different types of integration, all within the single analytical rubric of
production unit control.
This model has immediate consequences for lawyers engaged in
the analysis of the legal structure of business organization forms. First,
it will no longer be possible to invoke the "nexus of contracts"
conception in the belief that this conveys meaning of any structural
consequence. It will now also be more difficult to rely on propositions
formulated solely on the basis of transaction cost considerations. More
significantly, this model possesses normative implications that might
reposition or redirect the legal regulation of economic organization.
Thus, for example, it may be worth examining why exchange
opportunism is not legally constrained in the same way as production
opportunism. Or it may be important to investigate how the law affects
the manipulation of symbols implicated in the creation of corporate
culture. And it may be useful to determine, in view of the control
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motives for integration, the current suitability of particular competition
legislation provisions. The potential in the analysis of these kinds of
questions is for a more efficient jurisprudence of business organization
structure.
One final observation remains to be made. The production unit
model is a representation of the economic structure of the firm. One of
its functions, as noted, would be to inform assessments of the economic
efficiency of the firm's legal structure. The nature of the legal structure
itself, however, is a different matter, assuming that legal rules have
primary sources other than efficiency. If the legal rules applicable to the
firm arise initially out of public policy concerns with responsibility or
with relationship integrity, for example, a model is required to explain
the different legal characteristics of the alternative business organization
forms. Such a model would necessarily have to proceed on assumptions
about the material relations (economic structure) of the firm. Thus, in
order to provide a foundation for those assumptions, the modelling of
the economic structure should precede the modelling of legal structure.
It is that economic modelling exercise that has been undertaken here. It
is another task to construct the model of legal structure.
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